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Orthopaedic Surgeons and the
Medical Device Industry
The Threat to Scientific Integrity and the Public Trust
By Richard H. Gelberman, MD, David Samson, Esq, Sohail K. Mirza, MD, MPH, John J. Callaghan, MD,
and Vincent D. Pellegrini Jr., MD
The purpose of this article is to relate
recent actions by the United States
Department of Justice, the Institute of
Medicine, the Association of Ameri-
can Medical Colleges (AAMC), and
others to the specific challenges con-
fronting the specialty of orthopaedic
surgery. Further, it strives to reconcile
the duty and value propositions
associated with the orthopaedic
surgeon-medical device company re-
lationship, with the persistent risks
that are attendant to that relation-
ship, and to develop a new path—one
that strives to restore the integrity of
scientific investigation and day-to-
day clinical decision making, while
providing justification for future
physician-industry interaction. To
consider the topic in perspective, it is
interesting to assess the origins of
the current model of physician-
industry interaction as they relate
specifically to the issues currently
confronting the specialty of ortho-
paedic surgery.
In 1980, novel legislation in the
field of intellectual property, the Bayh-
Dole Act, for the first time allowed
universities and nonprofit organizations
to replace the government as the
principal beneficiaries of commercial
development resulting from basic-
science and clinical research. In essence,
the act transferred the ownership of
discoveries made with the help of
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authors, or a member of his or her immediate family, received, in any one year, payments or other benefits in excess of $10,000 or a commitment or
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federal research grants to the universi-
ties and small businesses where those
discoveries were made. On the face of it,
the Bayh-Dole Act made sense. Con-
vinced that government ownership had
deterred the development of incentives
necessary to promote innovation and
had severely inhibited productivity,
supporters saw the act as a remedy for
the depressed American economy in the
1970s. The goal of the act was specific—
to address the concern that American
firms were not using academic research
efficiently for commercialization—
and it intended to remedy that short-
coming by facilitating patenting and
licensing by U.S. universities of inven-
tions from federally funded research. If
successful, it could help to usher in
a new era of innovation in America. It
was an interesting concept—one that
supporters claim led to a very positive
chain of events and to years of U.S.
leadership in a variety of fields. The
pharmaceutical and medical device in-
dustries led the way, dramatically in-
creasing licenses and patents in the years
that followed the adoption of the
legislation.
For the medical profession, the
result was, according to one observer,
a modern alchemy, where ‘‘. . . ivory
towers were being turned into gold and
society was benefiting from hundreds
of novel treatments introduced for
a host of diseases.’’1 While that view
may have been accurate for a time,
a series of increasing concerns de-
veloped over the years following pas-
sage of the Bayh-Dole Act. In what has
been termed one of the most serious
unintended consequences of a major
piece of legislation, physician scien-
tists and their universities evolved
gradually from noble, highly trusted
institutions into something closer to
venture capital firms1. The increase in
substantial financial conflicts of in-
terest between clinical investigators
and industry rose to such a remarkable
level that, by 2007, a large percentage
of physicians2 and almost two-thirds
of the department chairs in America3,4
had important personal relationships
with industry, serving as consultants,
members of scientific advisory boards,
and paid speakers. With regard to the
integrity of decision making, however,
the resultant risks were slow to be
appreciated.
Only recently have academic
medical centers and professional so-
cieties begun to address, in a system-
atic way, the core issue—the
temptation of physicians to deviate
from their professional obligations for
economic or other personal gain2,3,5,6.
Gradually, it became clear that the
presence of self-interest associated
with sponsored research substantially
distorts how individuals make
choices—in the clinic, in the class-
room, and in the laboratory. Very
recently, leaders of some professional
societies and academic medical centers
have taken on the challenge of de-
termining how scientific objectivity
can be maintained in the face of
potentially compromising relation-
ships ensuing from grants, royalties,
and equity holdings provided to in-
dividual investigators and to academic
institutions7-14.
Despite some early efforts at self-
regulation, the complications associated
with the industry-physician partnership
became so severe in the early 2000s
that the Department of Justice entered
criminal conspiracy complaints against
five orthopaedic medical device com-
panies, alleging violations of the Federal
Anti-Kickback Statute. The government
accused the companies of ‘‘using con-
sulting agreements with orthopedic
surgeons as inducements to use a par-
ticular company’s artificial hip and knee
reconstruction and replacement prod-
ucts.’’15 Furthermore, the investigation
revealed that it was common practice
across America, from the late 1990s
through 2006, for physicians, who
performed work of little or no value, to
be rewarded with consulting contracts,
lavish trips and other perquisites15. In
addition, it found that physician con-
sultants failed to disclose the existence
of their relationships to the centers
where the surgeries were performed and
to the patients who were under their
care.
Compliance in the Wake of the ‘‘Big
Five’’ Nonprosecution and Deferred
Prosecution Agreements
In 2007, Zimmer, DePuy Orthopae-
dics, Biomet, Smith and Nephew, and
Stryker Orthopaedics (a division of
Howmedica Osteonics) were identified
by the U.S. Department of Justice as
providing improper financial incentives
to orthopaedic surgeons to induce their
selection of hip and knee devices. To
avoid criminal prosecution, these com-
panies entered into nonprosecution and
deferred prosecution agreements pur-
suant to which they agreed to eighteen
months of federal monitoring to ensure
their implementation of corporate
compliance procedures. Because these
companies together account for nearly
95% of the market for hip and knee
surgical implants16, this innovative
prosecutorial arrangement sought to
change the way an entire industry did
business.
Alleged violations of the Federal
Anti-Kickback Statute17 were the basis of
this unprecedented industry-wide en-
forcement effort. The companies had
been accused of providing financial
inducements to orthopaedic surgeons
through consulting agreements and di-
rect financial perquisites. At the crux of
these allegations was the underlying
conflict of interest that the Anti-Kickback
Statute is designed to prevent: the con-
flict between what is in the surgeon’s
financial interest and what is in the best
interest of the patient.
The nonprosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements have now
ended, successfully marking a new era
for the orthopaedic device industry. As
the federal monitor for Smith and
Nephew, one of us (D.S.) personally
observed the important compliance
improvements and industry transfor-
mation achieved by this process
throughout 2007 to 2009. The strict
compliance measures mandated by the
nonprosecution and deferred prosecu-
tion agreements in areas of (1) de-
termination of the need for health-care
professional consultants, (2) payments
to health-care professional consultants,
(3) disclosure and transparency
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regarding financial arrangements with
health-care professionals, and (4) com-
pliance training and hotline reporting
have all fostered an industry-wide
culture of improved compliance and
accountability. Of course, whether the
industry will continue on this positive
path remains to be seen, but the
structural sea changes have occurred
and corporate policies are in place to
ensure continued success.
Although the nonprosecution and
deferred prosecution agreements pro-
cess explicitly applied directly to only
the companies, the unacceptable trans-
actions and relationships that were the
subject of the federal proceeding always
involved two parties: a company and
a professional. Now with the expiration
of the nonprosecution and deferred
prosecution agreements, the health-
care professional side of the arrange-
ment will continue to be addressed. It
is certain that public scrutiny is far
from over because, as stated by David
Rothman, PhD, professor at Columbia
University and president of Columbia
University’s Institute on Medicine as
a Profession, ‘‘the rules of the game have
changed.’’18 The Department of Health
and Human Services Office of Inspector
General will expand enforcement efforts
by targeting individual orthopaedic
physicians who are as culpable as
medical device companies for entering
into illegal arrangements18, and these
expanded enforcement efforts will likely
result in negative public perception as to
the professional side of the subject
relationships. Now that device manu-
facturers have been identified and their
compliance practices have substantially
improved, there is a new challenge to
counter any negative public view and
build on the progress achieved within
the past eighteen months. To do this,
it is imperative that physicians adopt
and follow the strictest policies and
codes of ethics regarding their interac-
tions with the industry to avoid
both actual and apparent conflicts of
interest.
Inappropriate interactions be-
tween physicians and the medical de-
vice and pharmaceutical industries
have threatened scientific integrity and
diminished the public trust. While
much progress has been achieved, in
this environment of welcome scrutiny
and awareness—where a hotline report
can result in a full investigation or
whistle-blower suit—physicians must
be increasingly sensitive to public
perception and be proactive in their
approach to compliance to avoid sus-
picion and to maintain the integrity of
the profession and its relationship with
patients and its work products. This
requires adherence to the most strin-
gent codes of ethics and conflict-of-
interest policies, particularly those that
aim to avoid the appearance of im-
propriety by placing reasonable re-
straints on physician-industry
interactions.
Throughout the deferred prose-
cution agreement process, a number of
hotline reports concerning medical de-
vice company interactions with health-
care professionals were received. They
ranged from allegations of nepotism to
the providing of a free boat, expensive
meals, basketball tickets, and a day of
pheasant shooting. While it may be
argued that these kinds of activities are
de minimis and could not possibly result
in any inducement to use a certain
product, such an argument appears to
be at odds with current opinion.
Several recent studies have dem-
onstrated that offerings such as free
lunches, subsidized trips, and even
small gifts may influence a surgeon’s
medical judgment19. Physicians them-
selves have cited these studies and have
proposed the adoption of much stricter
limitations on interactions with the
pharmaceutical and medical device in-
dustries. For instance, on April 2, 2009,
a group of physicians issued a special
communication in the Journal of the
American Medical Association that, in
part, advised medical associations to
move toward a complete ban on in-
dustry funding20. The reasoning for this
stringent and progressive proposal is
that current policies are not adequately
detailed to prevent real or apparent
undue influence or bias and that lack
of strong uniform controls threatens
to undermine the reputation of the
profession.
The movement to adopt more
stringent policies is in direct response to
increasing public concern over physi-
cian conflicts of interest caused by
industry ties and is consistent with an
overall trend to further regulate and
control physician-industry interactions.
The AAMC has recommended strict
conflict-of-interest policies that place
limitations on faculty-industry rela-
tionships21. Institutions such as Johns
Hopkins22 and Partners HealthCare23
(a system that consists of Harvard-
affiliated facilities such as Massachusetts
General Hospital and Brigham and
Women’s Hospital) have recently
announced more stringent conflict-of-
interest policies that restrict physician-
industry ties. There have also been
recent legislative initiatives such as
a Massachusetts law requiring pharma-
ceutical and device manufacturers to
adhere to a strict marketing code of
conduct24; the Massachusetts law also
mandates disclosure of information
related to pharmaceutical and device
manufacturers’ financial arrangements
with health-care professionals, as does
a recently announced policy of the
Stanford University School of Medi-
cine25 and a recently proposed federal
law 26.
Stringent policies such as those
suggested in the Journal of the American
Medical Association proposal and ad-
vanced in other recent initiatives estab-
lish bright-line rules to avoid both
actual and perceived conflicts of interest
and, ultimately, allegations of illegality.
Courts have widely held that, regardless
of best intentions, if merely even one
purpose of an arrangement is to induce
federal health-care program referrals,
the Anti-Kickback Statute is violated27-30.
The determination of intent or purpose
is highly subjective; what is a kickback
to one may not be a kickback to another.
Without strict rules that seek to avoid
appearances of impropriety, it is diffi-
cult to consistently determine the
boundaries of acceptability in physician-
industry interactions, particularly in
areas such as the provision of gifts,
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entertainment, meals, and hospitality;
the existence or extent of inducement to
use a particular product will depend
on the circumstances and individuals
involved.
To address the inherent subjec-
tivity regarding physician-industry in-
teractions and overcome the public
stigma, physicians should adopt the
approach taken in the Journal of the
American Medical Association proposal
and other recent initiatives to adhere to
the strictest codes of ethics and conflict-
of-interest policies. The revised Adva-
Med (Advanced Medical Technology
Association) Code of Ethics on In-
teractions with Health Care Profes-
sionals31 serves as a useful standard that
aims to avoid negative perceptions. For
example, its recommendations include
(1) placing a blanket prohibition on the
provision of entertainment (including
activities such as theater, sporting
events, and hunting); (2) setting forth
stricter limitations on the provision of
meals in terms of purpose and setting
or location; and (3) prohibiting gifts,
other than the occasional provision of
items that benefit patients or serve
a genuine educational function and—
except for medical textbooks or ana-
tomical models used for educational
purposes—have a fair market value of
less than $100; notably, unlike the
previous AdvaMed Code, the revised
Code does not permit any type of
noneducational branded promotional
item, even if such an item is of minimal
value and related to the health-care
professional’s work or for the benefit of
patients (such as pens, notepads, and
mugs).
Physicians should strongly con-
sider adopting even stricter policies,
such as a complete prohibition on the
acceptance of industry gifts regardless
of purpose or value. In addition,
although it would not appear to be
prohibited under the AdvaMed Code
for a health-care professional to attend
a baseball game with a sales represen-
tative if the health-care professional is
paying his or her own way, it may be
regarded as inappropriate by others. To
avoid any perception of impropriety,
these kinds of situations should be
avoided.
The orthopaedic device industry
has made considerable progress toward
instilling a commitment to compliance;
however, the public perception of the
integrity of the profession is still at risk,
and there is a long way to go to elevate
the industry’s reputation.
The Duty Proposition: How Financial
Entanglements Can Blur the
Distinction Between Trade
and Profession
Guided by the Department of Justice,
industry has made progress over the
past few years toward managing con-
flicts effectively. Many surgeons, on
the other hand, continue to defend
a culture of entitlement and exception32,
a defense that is increasingly ineffective
against a public perception of greedy
doctors perpetuated by the lay press.
Headlines of major newspapers high-
light financial payments from industry
to physicians, without a balanced ex-
planation of context33. Public trust has
been eroded further by headlines link-
ing profit motives to the provision of
care. For instance, an article entitled ‘‘An
Operation to Ease Back Pain Bolsters
the Bottom Line, Too’’ states that ‘‘in
the absence of better data, critics in the
field point to a different reason for the
fusion operation’s fast rise: money.’’33
Another article quotes a patient who
warned, ‘‘When an orthopedist says you
need surgery and you are in terrible
pain, you assume he is right. . . . Think
long and hard.’’34 It has become in-
creasingly clear that, in the context of
financial conflicts, damaged perception
matters more than nuanced reality.
At its core, the clinical relation-
ship of physician and patient is a re-
ciprocal ‘‘clinical fidelity.’’35 Patients
share sensitive information with their
doctors, rely on advice provided, and
comply with treatments recommended.
In exchange, they expect undivided
loyalty from their physicians. In a vul-
nerable state of sickness, patients yearn
to believe that their doctors are caring
professionals—practitioners who
maintain their patients’ well-being
ahead of conflicting self-interest and
the interest of any other party 35. In an
era when orthopaedic surgeons earn
more by performing surgery than by
treating patients nonoperatively, the
choice of providing advice to patients
regarding surgery compared with the
act of performing the procedure con-
stitutes a fundamental conflict. Yet,
solutions that call for the separation
of the decision-making process from
the surgery itself are not feasible36-38.
A more appropriate outcome would
have physicians reengage in medicine
as a profession, not as a trade—a goal
that is facilitated by distancing patient-




Industry funding in orthopaedics is
strongly associated with favorable
outcomes, even for the scientific gold
standard of randomized clinical trials.
Results are favorable to the implant
manufacturer in 73% of industry-
sponsored studies compared with 44%
of independent studies40 (odds ratio,
3.3; 95% confidence interval, 2.4 to
4.5) for spine implants; 93% and 37%,
respectively, for hip implants; and
75% and 20% for knee implants41. A
pattern of results favorable to the
study sponsor is also observed more
generally in biomedical research.
Structured reviews of published stud-
ies have shown a results bias favoring
the sponsor, with an odds ratio of 8.0
(95% confidence interval, 1.1 to 53.2)
for studies funded by drug manufac-
turers, 3.6 (95% confidence interval,
2.6 to 4.9) for studies funded by
biomedical suppliers, and 5.3
(95% confidence interval, 2.0 to 14.4)
for studies funded by for-profit
organizations42.
True innovation deserves to be
rewarded. The long process from con-
cept to prototype, to investigational
device, to device approval, and to the
delivery of the device to the marketplace
depends on the personal drive and
sacrifice of the inventor and the risk
borne by the sponsor. Federal granting
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agencies and foundations rarely support
the process. Successful innovation de-
serves financial reward limited by mar-
ket valuation rather than arbitrary
thresholds. The problem is that true
innovation is rare.
A report by the National In-
stitute for Healthcare Management
Research and Educational Foundation
analyzed 1035 new drug applications
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration between 1989 and
200043. Of those drugs, 361 (35%)
had a new active ingredient, but 674
(65%) had an active ingredient that
was already marketed; 558 (54%)
offered the ingredient in a different
dosage route of administration or
a combination with other drugs; and
116 (11%) had the identical product
already available. The average price
of a new version was twice the price of
the older version. Device innovation
may be even more rare—with pro-
liferation of ‘‘me too’’ products flood-
ing the market with each new device
approval.
Myths and False Beliefs
Social science research has provided
important principles related to financial
conflicts of interest. We are all subject to
self-serving bias44. When individuals
have a stake in the outcome, they tend
to weigh arguments differently than if
the outcome is independent of personal
gain45.
The first myth is that conflicts of
interest are avoidable. Conflicts of
interest are unavoidable. There are
inherent conflicts between professional
values and self-interest. Routine activ-
ities such as recommending tests or
procedures have a conflict of interest if
the recommending physician is also
performing the same tests and pro-
cedures (Table I). Recommending
participation in a clinical trial is often
associated with being paid for referring
patients to the trial. Support for re-
search can be contingent on further
funding only if positive results are
produced. Writing prescriptions for
drugs often leads to a courtship by the
drug company. Using a specific product
is often associated with receiving gifts
or being paid by the company. These
are intrinsic conflicts associated with
medical practice. Unavoidable intrinsic
conflicts include the desire to obtain
noteworthy findings, the desire to
publish in academic journals, the need
to increase the number of research
publications, and the ambition to
advance a national reputation46. Faculty
in academic centers often seek to
advance their careers, vindicate intel-
lectual biases, receive accolades from
peers, and win research prizes. There is
also satisfaction in being the first to
fulfill the promise of a new procedure.
These are some of the intrinsic un-
avoidable conflicts associated with
research.
The second false belief is that bias
is a deliberate choice. Bias is not
a deliberate choice. Deliberate mis-
representation of data and findings is
fraud47. Fraud is rare, but self-serving
bias is pervasive. It affects individuals
in their evaluations of themselves.
Individuals often overestimate their
own contribution to joint tasks48. The
above-average effect, where more
than half of the individuals rate them-
selves within the top 50%, has been
identified in ethics discussions, mana-
gerial adeptness, productivity, and
health administration. Success is often
attributed to skill, and failure, to bad
luck48.
Individuals manifest different
notions of fairness49. When working
hard is compared with working long
hours, the individuals who work
more generally believe they should
earn more and those who work
less believe they should be paid
equally45.
The third false belief is that the
biasing effects of gifts can be controlled.
In a study of physicians, 76% believed
strongly that drug advertisements and
sales personnel were minimally impor-
tant in influencing their prescribing
habits, yet 49% changed their prescrib-
ing habits on the basis of drug pro-
motions50. This discrepancy suggests
either an unwillingness to admit in-





























Based on data presented in the study by Orlowski and Wateska52.
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fluence or a lack of awareness of
influence.
The biasing effect is also prom-
inent among physicians who attend
sponsored lectures. After attending
grand rounds sponsored by a drug
company, the medical residents pre-
scribed the company’s drug favorably,
with an odds ratio of 8.4 (95% confi-
dence interval, 2.1 to 38.9)51. They also
prescribed inappropriately, with an
odds ratio of 7.8 (95% confidence
interval, 1.6 to 45.5). There was no
difference in drug choice between those
who remembered the sponsor and those
who did not.
Some physicians strongly believe
that attending a sponsored symposium
does not influence them. Recent find-
ings of the effects of paid attendance at
a conference have indicated, however,
that the prescription of drugs increased
from eighty-one units in the twenty-two
months preceding a conference to 272
units in the seventeen months following
the conference52. Study of another drug
showed that prescriptions changed
from thirty-four units in the preceding
twenty-two months to eighty-seven
units in the subsequent seventeen
months (Fig. 1).
The fourth myth is that small gifts
do not matter. Social science research
has shown that what is considered
inappropriate depends on the individ-
ual’s perspective. In one study, 85% of
medical students believed that it was
inappropriate for a public official to
accept a $50 gift from a contractor;
however, only 46% of the medical
students believed it was inappropriate
for one of them to accept a $50 gift from
a drug firm53. Nearly all (97%) of nurse
practitioners thought it was inappro-
priate for a public official to accept a gift
from a contractor, and most (64%)
thought it was inappropriate for a
medical student to accept a gift from
a drug company. Only 30%, however,
believed that it was inappropriate for
a nurse practitioner to accept a $50
gift from a drug company 53.
Physicians and patients have dif-
ferent attitudes toward gifts. Patients are
more likely than physicians to consider
gifts as inappropriate and influential.
Even small gifts, such as trips, dinners,
pocket knives, lunches, mugs, drug
samples, textbooks, pens, and videos,
are more often considered inappropri-
ate and influential by patients than by
physicians (Table II)54.
The fifth false belief is that bias is
recognizable. Bias is difficult to recog-
nize. In a survey of resident physicians,
61% stated that industry promotions
and context did not influence their own
prescribing, but only 16% believed that
other physicians were similarly unaf-
fected55. Every medical resident who
considered lunches and pens inappro-
priate had accepted these gifts55. The
difference shows inconsistency in phy-
sician attitudes of self compared with
others.
The sixth false belief is that
education reduces bias. Social science
research has shown that awareness and
knowledge about the biasing effect of
gifts do not lead to a reduction in the
effects of gifts44,56.
Limits of Disclosure
Disclosure, as a method for managing
conflicts, has limitations. An underlying
fundamental problem, termed moral
license, holds that, like confession,
disclosure provides the surgeon investi-
gator a feeling of absolution without
cleansing the potentially tainted mes-
sage56. Disclosure creates the false im-
pression that biased advice is fair play.
Professional medical associations often
pay lip service to disclosure through
unenforced and ineffective policies;
members participating in the meetings
frequently treat it casually as an oblig-
atory burdensome step. Despite stan-
dards of professionalism established
by the American Academy of Ortho-
paedic Surgeons (AAOS), the program
for the 2007 Annual Meeting disclosed
only 71.2% (245) of 344 payments
reported by the five arthroplasty im-
plant manufacturers on their web sites.
While the AAOS program disclosures
did not include dollar amounts, in-
dustry web sites provided more detailed
information, indicating that forty-seven
consultants were paid over $1 million
a year57-62. Christopher J. Christie Jr.,
when he was U.S. Attorney for the
District of New Jersey, stated frankly
that the target would be shifted from
industry squarely to the orthopaedic
surgeon: ‘‘I’ve dealt with the supply
issue, now I need to deal with the
demand issue.’’63 Legal action and ex-
ternal policing of this sort indicates how
we and how our professional associa-
tions may have failed to protect the
health of the public and the integrity
of the profession.
TABLE II Attitudes of Patients and Physicians Toward Gifts*
Inappropriate (%) Influential (%)
Gift Patients Physicians Patients Physicians
Trip 59 75 56 42
Dinner 47 33 48 24
Pocketknife 38 49 28 12
Lunch 23 10 29 12
Mug 23 18 31 8
Drug sample 22 26 42 55
Major textbook 20 29 38 10
Pen 19 4 31 8
Video 18 12 38 22
Small textbook 16 17 37 9
*Based on data in the study by Gibbons et al.54.
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In a concept described as an-
choring, individuals have difficulty un-
learning, ignoring, or suppressing the
use of knowledge even if, subsequently,
it becomes apparent that the data are
inaccurate56. When evidence on which
beliefs are made is discredited, the
beliefs do not revert to their original
state. They show the persistent effects
of the discredited evidence. This phe-
nomenon has been described as the
‘‘curse of knowledge’’ or the ‘‘failure
of evidentiary discreditation.’’56
The Association of American
Medical Colleges Recommendations
The AAMC published guidelines to
facilitate the development of institu-
tional policies related to financial
conflicts64,65. The guidelines offer prin-
ciples for examining and redesigning
relationships with industry to conform
to standards of medical professional-
ism. A report, issued in February 2008,
entitled ‘‘Protecting Patients, Preserv-
ing Integrity, Advancing Health: Ac-
celerating the Implementation of COI
Policies in Human Subjects Research’’
called on all medical schools and major
universities to develop and implement
conflict-of-interest policies within two
years66.
While orthopaedic surgeons are
required to work closely with the device
industry for research and product in-
novation, industrial sponsorship of re-
search differs from federal funding in
several important ways. The subject of
research in federal funding is typically
fundamental science, whereas the sub-
ject for industry funding is product-
based science. The application process
for federal funding is complex com-
pared with, typically, a simple one to
two-page proposal for many industrial
grants. The application review process is
peer review for federal funding and
business review for industry funding.
The degree of difficulty in obtaining
funding is different. Federal funding is
competitive, and industry funding is
typically noncompetitive. Response
time to the funding application is
prolonged in federal grants compared
with a rapid review and response in
industry support. The contact between
the sponsor and researcher is rare in
federal support, whereas it is frequent
in industry support. The timing for
accrual of research data is not typically
specified in federal funding, whereas
it can be discreetly specified in industry
funding. Access to all research data
for all study sites is usually not re-
stricted in federal funding. Typically, it
is very restricted in industry funding.
The relationship between a sponsor
and the study findings is disinterested
for federal funding, whereas the
sponsor is typically invested in the
research outcomes for industry fund-
ing. Other factors include differences
in protected time for researchers and
investigators, salary support for in-
vestigators, and the ability to use
funding for academic promotion or
academic reputation.
Policies related to research activ-
ities have typically not addressed com-
mon relationships between investigators
and sponsors. Investigators frequently
report direct payments from industry,
holding office in the company, or
receiving gifts from sponsors. However,
these types of activities are rarely
addressed in institutional policies64,65,67.
Our professional associations must de-
velop methods of providing clinical
context for device manufacturers while
shielding individual patient-care deci-
sions from undue commercial influ-
ence. Options include the development
of scientific review processes for the
distribution of industry research and
education funds, the creation of regis-
tries to measure end results of im-
planted devices, and the provision of
transparent taxation mechanisms to
allow device manufacturers to sponsor
the development of continuing educa-
tion courses.
International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors Recommendations
The International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors (ICMJE) published uni-
form requirements for manuscripts
submitted to biomedical journals68.
These requirements are aimed to protect
the integrity of the research process and
the investigators. They require that the
investigators retain access to all trial data,
control all editorial and publication
decisions, and fully disclose the role of
the sponsor. ICMJE has advocated for
a ‘‘‘rebuttable presumption’ standard by
which an investigator is presumed to be
ineligible to conduct human subjects
research in which he or she has a signif-
icant financial interest, unless that in-
vestigator is uniquely qualified to do so,
TABLE III International Committee









6. Grants and/or grants pending
7. Honoraria
8. Payment for manuscript preparation
9. Patents (planned, pending, or issued)
10. Royalties
11. Payment for development of
educational presentations including
service on speakers’ bureaus
12. Stock and/or stock options
13. Travel and/or accommodation
expenses covered or reimbursed
14. Other (err on the side of full
disclosure)
*According to Drazen et al.71, disclosure
applies to financial and nonfinancial
relationships involving the author, insti-
tution, spouse or partner, and children
under eighteen years of age. Any per-
sonal, professional, political, institutional,
religious, or other associations that a
reasonable reader would want to know in
relation to the submitted work, including
all sources of revenue and any entity
that could broadly be considered rele-
vant for the thirty-six months prior to
submission of the work, and all rela-
tionships outside the thirty-six-month
window that readers may want to know
and could reasonably criticize an author
for not disclosing. Public funding sources,
such as the National Institutes of Health
or the Medical Research Council, need
not be disclosed.
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and even then, only under carefully
monitored conditions.’’69 The ICMJE has
also introduced uniform requirements
for disclosure70-73. While dollar amounts
are not required, sponsors are identified
for fourteen explicit categories of finan-
cial support (Table III)70-72,74.
Institute of Medicine
Recommendations
The Institute of Medicine published an
extensive report on conflicts of interest
in medicine75. The report provides de-
tailed steps to disclose, manage, and
monitor adherence to management of
conflicts of interest (Fig. 2, Table IV).
The Value Proposition
Despite the shortcomings of the surgeon-
medical device industry relationship
noted in recent years, the value of
the partnership, insofar as patient out-
comes are concerned, is undeniable.
In the early days of implant develop-
ment, the intellectual contribution
provided by the orthopaedic surgeon
was more easily defined. Homer Stryker
of Kalamazoo, Michigan, founded his
own company, John Charnley devel-
oped his own hip arthroplasty implant
and brought it to industry for com-
mercialization, and the Association for
the Study of Internal Fixation (AO/
ASIF) developed a series of implants
that were licensed to the Straumann
Institute (Waldenburg, Switzerland)
and distributed under the Synthes
trademark. Initially, these implants were
small in scope and were used by
relatively few surgeons. Regulation of
the commercial manufacture and dis-
tribution of the implants in the 1950s
and 1960s was rudimentary. Few ques-
tioned the value of the partnerships in
elevating the quality of care of patients
with musculoskeletal disorders76.
The maturation of the field over
the last half century has presented
both opportunities and, more recently,
threats to the orthopaedic surgeon-
industry partnership, especially with
regard to orthopaedic implant design
and distribution and to the education of
professionals2,76-78. If it is accepted that
the development of novel devices is
beneficial, the process by which an
orthopaedic surgeon may contribute to
design and distribution requires explicit
documentation.
Intellectual Property and Patents
The criterion for royalty justification
has come under question most recently
with the Department of Justice investi-
gation. It has been established that
intellectual property must be trans-
ferred between the orthopaedic surgeon
and the company in a design project
if a royalty payment is to be made. Many
Fig. 2
Developed from recommendations in the Institute of Medicine 2009 report75.
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consider the ownership of patents as the
only true intellectual property. In law,
however, patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, know-how, and trade secrets are
all considered intellectual property.
Moreover, one could contend that the
involvement of surgical practitioners is
helpful to the marketing of a device in
that such involvement should ensure
the teaching of appropriate indications.
Only patents (considered true inven-
tions), copyrights, and trademarks are
granted exclusive rights protected by
law. Know-how (the ability to execute
specific tasks or to produce specific
products [reducing an invention to
practice]), however, is essential to the
commercial success of many patented
inventions. Only surgeons who have
analyzed their results critically and
have demonstrated an understanding
of the process of the development of
ideas to product development can add
value to the process. This understand-
ing cannot be thoroughly accom-
plished without extensive publication
on the general topic (but not neces-
sarily on the same implant or on the
device being developed). Surgeon vol-
ume as the sole contribution is not an
appropriate criterion for design team
involvement.
Licensing
Intellectual property is often transferred
or sold by its inventor through the
process of licensing. In the typical
license agreement, the inventor charges
a royalty to the purchaser licensee for
the right to utilize the inventor’s in-
tellectual property, which often includes
related unprotected know-how as well
as protected patents. The inventor often
transfers the right for the licensee to
pursue patents based on the inventor’s
know-how. Most licensees recognize
that know-how is central to commer-
cialization of an invention. The moni-
tors of the companies involved in the
Department of Justice investigation
agreed with this interpretation and
developed a fair value amount in terms
of the percentage of product sales
(royalty burden) that is appropriate for
an orthopaedic implant.
Documentation of Work Effort
Another important feature of the value
proposition that has been developed
with regard to the royalty and consult-
ing partnership is documentation of
time, effort, and level of personal
contribution to a project. The attorney
mindset of billing for time spent on
a project (which is now required in the
surgeon-industry partnership) com-
pared with the medical professional
mindset of billing for a completed task,
clinic visit, or operation—no matter
how much time is required—can be
culturally difficult for a medical profes-
sional. Many physicians are concerned
about the potential for overbilling,
whether it is related to time or to the
potential to justify the time on the basis
of overdocumentation. The adage that if
it was not documented, it was not done
is becoming an important standard for
the orthopaedic surgeon who consults
with industry. This process, however,
should be easier for the surgeon to
accept, as the same practice is being
applied in the clinical setting, especially
in cases in which the government is
subsidizing care through Medicare. Fair
market value for consulting time is
dictated by outside sources, most re-
cently the monitors in the case of
the deferred prosecution and nonprose-
cution agreements of the Justice
Department.
Finding a New Path for Orthopaedic
Surgeons and Industry:
Beyond Disclosure
All discussions of conflict of interest to
date have hastened to enumerate the
TABLE IV Recommendations by the Institute of Medicine*
General policy
1. Adopt and implement conflict-of-interest policies
2. Strengthen disclosure policies
3. Standardize disclosure content and formats
4. Create a national program for the reporting of company payments
Medical research
5. Restrict participation of researchers with conflicts of interest in research with human
participants
Medical education
6. Reform relationships with industry in medical education
7. Provide education on conflict of interest
8. Reform financing system for continuing medical education
Medical practice
9. Reform financial relationships with industry for community physicians
10. Reform industry interactions with physicians
Clinical practice guidelines
11. Restrict industry funding and conflicts in clinical practice guideline development
12. Create incentives for reducing conflicts in clinical practice guideline development
Institutional conflict-of-interest policies
13. Create board-level responsibility for institutional conflicts of interest
14. Revise Public Health Service regulations to require policies on institutional conflicts of
interest
Supporting organizations
15. Provide additional incentives for institutions to adopt and implement policies
16. Develop research agenda on conflict of interest
*Summarized from the Institute of Medicine report entitled ‘‘Conflict of Interest in Medical
Research, Education, and Practice.’’75
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‘‘do nots’’ in physician relationships
with industry7,11,14. Short of acknowl-
edging the need to preserve a positive
interaction between medicine and in-
dustry, however, none have sought to
define the parameters that would char-
acterize such a relationship. Such should
also be our task.
In order to establish the new
parameters of a constructive relationship
with industry, one first acknowledges
that a relationship is important, if not
essential, but that the current iteration is
flawed. The critical error lies in the too
liberal assignment of value to casual,
nonsubstantive interactions that sur-
geons have with device manufacturers.
More holes in an acetabular shell, a 5
increase in the screw angle of a volar
distal radial plate, or an additional cross-
link between spinal rods do not nec-
essarily constitute material product
improvements worthy of compensation.
Secondly, while some of the errors have
been egregious, the demonization of any
relationship with industry overshoots the
mark and may lead to considerable harm
in the long run. Some have proposed
a ‘‘zero financial interest tolerance’’ for
physicians in critical positions that relate
to industry and provide potential for
personal gain20,79,80. Elimination of in-
dividuals from important tasks and
groups because they receive appropriate
compensation for critical contributions
handicaps the process and risks com-
promise of the quality of the final
product. The contributions of those with
such conflicts should be preserved by
effective management of the relation-
ship rather than by complete dismissal
of the individual. Further, it is in-
cumbent on our profession to repair
any perception of disrepute insofar as
industry relationships are concerned.
Modifications in physician behavior are
the requisite for a healthy physician-
industry relationship, framed by the
need to move beyond simple disclosure
in protecting ourselves from the perils
of conflicts of interest. In the words of
David Korn, MD, ‘‘Disclosure is es-
sential but not sufficient,’’ in charac-
terizing the relationship between
medical professionals and industry 81.
Components of a Healthy
Physician-Industry Relationship
The futuristic approach to the construc-
tive and ethically acceptable surgeon-
industry relationship is predicated on
four fundamental principles:
1. Complete Disclosure and
Transparency of Conflicts
As has been articulated by some, a
detailed and complete disclosure of
financial and other substantive relation-
ships is the starting point81. Specific
dollar amounts received from industry
for efforts related, directly or indirectly,
to the matter at hand are disclosed12,82,83.
This is most effectively accomplished on
a web site in the public domain; indeed,
most of the pertinent companies and an
increasing number of universities al-
ready have such a policy. Objective
reporting, such as income noted on U.S.
Internal Revenue Service form 1099,
should be the basis for such declara-
tions. An unwillingness to disclose such
relationships in this manner constitutes
a basis for exclusion from any related
position, task, or group. Moreover,
surgical consent forms for an operation
should disclose the existence of such
surgeon-industry relationships to pa-
tients prior to the operative procedure
being performed; some institutions
have already adopted such a policy and
standardized form. This provides a con-
text within which every observer may
judge the potential bias of each re-
spective contributor when presenting at
a meeting, publishing a paper, or
participating in a group discussion.
2. Realistic Assessment of
Actual Value Added
The material value of a surgeon-
innovator’s contribution is assessed by
some dispassionate third party, a group
comprising representative individuals
from industry as well as a medical peer
group. It is anticipated that there will be
far fewer substantive compensable con-
tributions as a result of this process.
Likewise, it is assumed that this will be
the cornerstone of a more credible,
ethical, and consistent system of reward
for surgeon designers.
3. Objective Third-Party
Determination of ‘‘Fair Market Value’’
As the term implies, market forces
appropriately determine fair compensa-
tion for intellectual property transfer and
consulting activity subsequent to a de-
termination of real value added. It is
expected that the royalty load for a given
project varies within some range de-
pendent on the magnitude and impact of
each contribution and the relative suc-
cess of the product in the marketplace.
Similarly, natural market forces, overseen
and approved by an objective third party,
should govern hourly remuneration rates
for consulting activities. This is con-
trasted with the current state, where
a predetermined hourly rate for consult-
ing activities and fixed percent of royalty
load is set arbitrarily, independent of
market forces, by regulators who them-
selves may be conflicted.
4. Removal of Linkage from
Patient-Care Decision Making
Any conflict of interest, be it real or
perceived, derives from the association
of personal gain of the individual
physician with the selection of a product
which the physician participates in or
even directs on behalf of the patient.
Disclosure is no longer thought to
confer immunity to being influenced84.
If the role of the physician in the
development process is to be preserved
because he or she adds value, it then
stands to reason that the triangle
connecting the physician, the patient,
and the vendor must be interrupted.
The physician is either dissociated from
the patient or from industry in this
triangle; any role in device selection on
behalf of the patient or the potential
for personal gain by the physician
(through reciprocity with the vendor) is
eliminated. While at first blush the
disconnection of the physician from the
decision-making process for any in-
dividual patient appears contrary to the
altruistic role of the physician, many
health-care systems in the United
States have already compromised the
surgeon’s ability to choose on behalf
of the patient (e.g., by limiting implants
to those supplied by certain vendors
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chosen by the institution, most often
based on favorable pricing consider-
ations). Common practice currently
precludes a royalty benefit to a design-
ing surgeon based on patients cared for
in the surgeon’s home institution, but
some would claim a serious conflict
persists if the surgeon’s payment re-
mains correlated with the use of any
specific implant. An alternative hybrid
scenario might create a third-party-
administered ‘‘innovator pool’’ that
provides a reimbursement premium to
surgeon-innovators whenever the pro-
cedure in question is performed, irre-
spective of which implant is used in any
particular patient or which company
manufactured it. Under such a system,
the surgeon-designer is rewarded for
participation in the product develop-
ment process in a manner not con-
nected with the use of any specific
device in any particular patient. For
example, the predetermined ‘‘royalty
load’’ of a given device from each
manufacturer might be paid to an
independently governed fund rather
than to any individual designing sur-
geon. The aggregate pool of royalty
payments related to surgeon-designed
devices would then be distributed to
participating surgeon innovators on the
basis of relevant metrics such as the
time spent on projects and the success
of the devices, rather than having
payment linked to the success of any
specific implant with which the surgeon
may be involved. This approach would
retain a more general incentive for the
surgeon-innovator while separating the
direct surgeon link to industry; it
therefore also potentially preserves the
physician role as agent in decision
making for the individual patient.
Likewise, the establishment of such
a ‘‘medical device tax’’ could also
perpetuate industry sponsorship of re-
search and education, considering that
the incentive for industry to continue its
support of such activities is diminished
by removal of its direct link to the
surgeon who makes implant-purchasing
decisions.
No matter how the surgeon-
designer is removed from the conflict-of-
interest triangle (e.g., eliminating the
prospect of financial gain as was the
case in the early history of implant
development, or divorcing the physician-
innovator from the process of device
selection for any individual patient),
there will be at least a temporary period
when review of these situations by
a dispassionate third party (an ethicist)
will add considerable value in reassuring
the public that the medical profession
has adopted an ethical and transparent
approach to relationships with industry.
It is likely that there will be increasing
demand for such individuals providing
counsel to academic health centers in the
years to come. Beyond the role of
advisor, a principal function of such
an individual might be to provide a
binding review and adjudication of
conflict-of-interest disclosure as well as a
determination of the appropriate re-
lationship structure between industry
and physician-innovators as we move
forward.
Whatever approach is adopted to
raise our profession from the present
quagmire must ensure ethical relation-
ships between industry and the medical
community and must restore the pub-
lic trust in the treating physician as
having the welfare of the patient as the
principal motive. A thoughtful and
reflective dialogue involving medicine,
the lay public, and industry is essential.
Elements of such a relationship include
complete and full disclosure, a realistic
assessment of value added, an inde-
pendent determination of fair market
value, and elimination of any linkage
of the surgeon to either specific patient
decision making or a relationship with
industry that provides for personal gain.
Amid all of this, we strive to protect the
ethical interaction between medicine
and industry that has fueled proper
medical advances over the years. For all
those who partake in the discussion,
nothing less than genuine altruism will
be required, as well as a clear and
irrevocable understanding that what
is past has passed and the future of
all relationships with industry will
look very different. Our choice is
simple; we can elect to be part of the
solution or a continuing part of the
problem.
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